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It is a real pleasure for me to participate in this festschrift in honour of my 
good friend I<aushik Basu, to recognize his intellectual contributions, his 
contributions as a public intellectual, and his contributions as both a national 
and global public servant. 
The subject of my chapter is one to which Kaushik has made profound 
contributions: markets, states, and institutions. In particular, I want to high-
light how our thinking about this subject has changed over the past third of a 
century; and to provide an overarching framework into which these changes 
can be placed-a framework that both helps explain why the approaches 
taken in the past have been less successful than was hoped in promoting 
development, and provides some guidance for policy reforms and research 
going forward. 
Earlier work both at the World Bank and within the development commu-
nity more generally focused on necessary reforms to policy frameworks. These 
'reforms'-the now Infamous Washington Consensus policies-mostly con-
sisted of giving a larger role to markets In the allocation of resources. 
When these reforms were less successful than hoped, there was a switch to a 
focus on lnstftutions, including those of the public sector. It was recognized 
that the policy refonns had to be Instituted by governments, and that gov-
ernments often failed to do what was required. Thus, even If the overall 
agenda was to place a greater emphasis on markets, to accomplish that end 
one needed reforms tn at least one key Institution-the government-to bring 
that about. 
There was a second rationale for a focus on lmtitutions-there were perva-
sive market failures, and a hope that non-market institutions, on their own, 
would 'step in' to fill the gap. This beltef was not based on any deep theory, but 
rather on the notion that with a market failure (say the absence of an insUra.nce 
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market) there was an opportunity for a Pareto-improving non-market action. 
A strong Hayekian belief in decentralized evolution suggested that such ev0-
lution would lead society to higher and higher levels of well-being-especially 
to Pareto improvements. These beliefs were reflected, for instance, in the idea 
that non-market life insurance, say provided by the family or burial societies 
I 
would be adequate to address market deficiencies. No government interven-
tion would be needed. This particular line of research, sometimes associated 
with Douglas North's early work, was laid to rest when Amott and Stiglitz 
(1991) showed that the Nash equilibrium with non-market institutions could 
be worse than without these institutions. There is an incentive for such insti-
tutions to be created, but they may actually displace the admittedly imperfect 
markets, in such a way as to lower welfare. 1 
Both markets and states are, of course, institutions-institutions through 
which we allocate resources. It used to be argued that, in thinking about the 
best way of organizing societal systems of resource allocation, one assessed in 
which sectors the market should dominate, and in which sectors the state. The 
perspective was that fully private goods should be produced by the private 
sector; those associated with the delivery of public goods should be produced 
by the state. 
Today we see the interaction in a more complicated way: in many cases, the 
two interact, in a complementary way, within the same sectors. For instance, 
there is the possibility of the separation of finance from production; govern-
ment could provide finance for a typically publicly provided service, like 
education, but the production would be done through private enterprises. In 
the provision of infrastructure, there has been great interest in public-private 
partnerships (PPPs). In the financial (and other sectors) which might have 
seemed to fall naturally within the private sector, there is an important role 
for government regulation. And in some areas, government has had to do 
more: underwriting mortgages, providing finance for small businesses, and-
espectally in many developing countries-providing long-term finance. 
While in recent years there has been a great deal of hyperbole over PPPs, in 
practice, there has been disappointment. PPPs often entail the government 
taking the risk, while the private sector takes the profits. So too, the conditions 
under which government can delegate to a private body the fulfilment of public 
objectives have been shown to be extraordinarily restrictive (Sappington and 
Stiglitz, 1987). 
1 See also Sttglitz (2000) and World Bank (2001). This result only holds if non-market tnsurers 
have no better information than market insurers. Given the restrictive conditions under which 
Nash equilibria within market econom.Ies achieve Pareto efficiency, there was little grounds for the 
presumption that this broad Nash equilibrium, Involving market and non-market institutions, 
would be efficient. For a broader critique of these naive evolutionary ideas, see Stiglitz (1994). 
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The standard argument for introducing a role for government began with the 
theory of market failures-the work of Arrow and Debreu identified a large 
variety of circumstances in which private markets do not lead to (Pareto) effi-
cient outcomes. Subsequent work by Greenwald and Sti.glitz (1986) showed that 
whenever information was incomplete (asymmetric) or markets incomplete-
that is, always-markets were not efficient. The presumption that markets were 
efficient, which had reigned since Adam Smith, was reversed: the presumption 
now was that markets were inefficient. There was always a potential role for 
government. 
But while there was a potential role for government, it was not always 
obvious that government could fulfil this role. Attention shifted to govern-
ment failure. While the theory of government failure is not as well-developed 
as that of market failure, it is clear not only that governments often fail, but 
also that such failures are not inevitable: even imperfect governments can 
result in an improvement in resource allocation. They can help markets work 
better. Indeed, it is hard to find any country that has had successful develop-
ment in the absence of strong government interventions. 
But as our understanding of government failures has increased in recent 
years, so too has our grasp of the depth of market failures-highlighted by the 
financial crisis of 2008. 
More importantly, we have come to appreciate markets as institutions that 
must be structured. Markets do not exist in a vacuum. They are structured 
by public policy, by the rules of the game that are set by the government, 
for instance through laws that relate to corporate governance, competition 
policy, and labour market regulation. 
These then are the central messages of this chapter: 
(a) In any society, resource allocations occur within institutions, so that the 
rules governing the institution are critical, particularly the rules deter-
mining how decisions are made within it. Institutions consist of mul-
tiple individuals, with differences in preferences and beliefs. A critical 
issue is how these are 'aggregated', so that the institution reflects in 
some adequate way those within the institution. This was the central 
question posed by Arrow in Social Choice and Individual Values (1951). 
His results were deeply disturbing, for he showed that there was no 
way of aggregating the multiple preference orderings of the different 
individuals comprising an institution that had certain desirable proper-
ties (like transitivity), in the absence of some restrictions on preferences 
and/or the choice set-other than dictatorship, where the actions 
chosen were those that reflected the preferences and beliefs of a 
single member. This negative result poses one of the great challenges 
for governance. 
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(b) Societal resource allocations are the result. of the in~eraction among 
these institutions. In recent years, economists have given a great deal 
of attention to 'mechanism design'; that is, to the design of allocation 
mechanisms with certain desirable (usually efficiency) properties. But 
the set of institutions in place in any economy is not the result of 
rational deliberation over alternative mechanisms (even if our politi-
cians understood what that entailed). Rather, they have evolved, With 
adjustment of one set of institutions or an~ther in r~sponse to changes 
in the world and changes in ideas, including learrung from past suc-
cesses and failures. As a result, there is no presumption that, in any 
country, the existing set of institutions or the rules governing their 
interactions are optimal in any sense, that they produce either efficient 
or equitable outcomes. A key concept in institutional design has been 
'checks and balances': a recognition that within an institutional 
arrangement (say government), there is the danger of the aggrandize-
ment of power in the hands of a subset of individuals, or even a single 
individual, resulting in decisions that reflect that individual's or those 
individuals' perceptions or interests. At the societal level, the same 
issues arise: we should see different institutions as providing checks 
and balances on each other. 
(c) The functioning of markets (both the decisions made by individual 
institutions and the outcomes of the interactions among the institu-
tions) depends on the rules of the game specified by the political process, 
which in tum depends on the rules of the political game and underlying 
characteristics of society, most importantly, the magnitude of economic 
inequality and the degree of solidarity and political cohesion. But the 
functioning of markets also depends on trust. No economy can rely on 
the enforcement of contracts through the legal system. Trust, especially 
as it relates to the functioning of market institutions, depends in part on 
perceptions of the legitimacy of the economic and political system, 
which in tum depends on perceptions of fairness and equity. In short, 
the functioning of the market depends on non-market institutions and 
beliefs and perceptions that reach beyond the market. By focusing too 
narrowly on markets, by creating markets that are seemingly disjointed 
from the rest of society, by taking excessively tolerant views of market 
abuses (of the kind that became rampant in financial markets before and 
during the 2008 crisis), market advocates may have actually under-
mined the success of markets. 2 
th 2 That is, when markets are viewed as non-competitive, when they abuse the consumers that 
legieytimar; su~~~ serve, when ~ey are able to extract excessive rents, markets lose their 
cy ms for allocating resources, and there will be less voluntary compliance 
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( d) If a system of checks and balance among in titution within ociety is 
to work-to en ure that ocietal re ource allocations do not come to 
reflect the intere t and belief of a certain subset of individuals-then 
there cannot exi t exce si e economic inequality. For if there is exces-
sive economic inequality, there is at least a risk that this economic 
inequality will get reflected in political inequality-in inequality in 
key public institutions. The voice of the wealthy will predominate 
both public choices (public allocations of resources) and in the setting 
of the rules of the game. In short, the emphasis of the World Bank and 
development economists more generally on the governance of public 
institutions is correct, but good governance is, in part at least, an 
endogenous variable. Lectures about good governance won't succeed if 
the conditions for good governance aren't there. Policy discourse 
should focus not just on what is entailed by good governance (e.g. 
transparency and accountability) but also on the conditions necessary 
to create and sustain good governance, e.g. reforms in economic policies 
that lead to greater equality both in market incomes and in income and 
wealth after taxes and transfers. 
(e) Everyone benefits from the good performance of the public sector-
including having the rules of the economic game written in ways that 
support efficient and equitable outcomes. But since the public good is a 
public good, there will be an under-supply of efforts at maintaining 
good public governance, making it particularly easy for interest groups 
to capture the state. The rules of the game for the public sector have 
to recognize this and guard against it. We will discuss in Section 3 what 
this en tails. 
1 New Understandings of Markets 
Since the development of the Walrasian economic model,3 a particular view of 
the market economy has prevailed. It entails simplistic firms that maximize 
profits (or stock market value in a dynamic context), and households consisting 
of unitary actors, with households and firms interacting in competitive markets 
through a price mechanism. Economists celebrated the informational effi-
ciency of prices, the ability of prices to provide requisite information from 
households to firms and vice versa: firms don't have to have knowledge 
With the terms of (Implicit or explicit) contracts. In Freefall (Stiglltz, 2010) I detail the host of 
abusive practices engaged in by the fmandal sector in the years surrounding the financial crisis. 
3 There were many key contributions over the more than a century during which that model 
evolved, including formallz.ations by Arrow, Debteu, and Samuelson. 
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of other firms' technology or of households' preferences, and similarly, 
households don't have to have any knowledge of technology or resource 
availability. It was all quite miraculous. 
This view of the market economy relied on three critical assumptions that are 
worth noting for the purposes of this discussion: (a) In each institution (treating 
firms and households as institutions), there was no problem of preference 
aggregation. Indeed, the issue was not even recognized; (b) Each institution 
faithfully carried out what was agreed-there was no problem of contract 
enforcement; (c) All markets were competitive-no one had mar~et power. 
There were other assumptions, such as those relating to information, 
which are critical to the results concerning the efficiency of the resulting 
resource allocations. Advances in recent decades have shown the central role 
of over-simplistic information assumptions employed in standard analyses. 
For instance, even a small amount of information imperfection could generate 
a high level of market power, both within an institution (like a household or a 
firm; see for example Edlin and Stiglitz, 1995) or across institutions (monop-
oly and monopsony power; see Diamond, 1971; Stiglitz, 1985b, 2009, 2013). 
The absence of good information provides opportunities for one group to 
exploit others. Most fundamentally, as we have already noted, with even 
slight imperfections and asymmetries of information, there is a presumption 
that the market economy-even if it were competitive-is not efficient. 
There was, in the traditional analyses of a market economy, no discussion of 
institutions and institutional interactions simply because institutions didn't 
matter. They were 'superficial'. We saw the world through institutions. In 
agriculture there was the institution of sharecropping; in finance, the institu-
tion of banks. But economics looked deeper, beneath the surface, to the 
underlying economic forces-the laws of supply and demand. Simply by 
studying these, one could understand resource allocations (including distri-
bution of income). 
In the past forty years, the foundations of all of these assumptions under-
lying the standard model have been challenged-and so too the belief that 
institutions dJdn't matter. 
1.1 Aggregation 
One example of a challenge to these assumptions involves preference aggre-
gation. The family is now seen as consisting of several members with often 
confllctin -..& , g P•cerences and beliefs. Household resource allocations cannot be 
~ as If the family maxJmized some family social welfare function. It is 
ant escrJbed as the result of a complex bargaining situation. This is import· 
' because there are changes, which in standard theory would make no 
difference, but which might affect the bargaining power of each member 
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and which affect the resulting resource allocations. One of the reasons for the 
success of the Grameen microcredit programmes is that they changed the 
power relationships within the household; so too for their mortgage pro-
grammes, which required the transfer of title to women, and which affected 
incentives for divorce. 
Kaushik's pioneering work (Basu and Van 1998; Basu 1999) on child labour 
shows how changing the rules-not allowing child labour-can have general 
equilibrium effects, which are welfare enhancing.4 
In the case of the firm, it has been shown that the conditions under which 
there is unanimity about what the firm should do are very restrictive. 5 There 
has to be a full set of Arrow-Debreu securities. 6 
The modem theory of the firm (Berle and Means 1932) has emphasized that 
there are multiple stakeholders in the firm, and that managers do not neces-
sarily and in general do not fully represent the interests of any group other 
than themselves. Because of imperfections of information, there has to be 
delegation of decision-making authority (Stiglitz 1985a), and managers will 
inevitably be decisive. 
Importantly for our purposes, society has not left the working-out of the 
power relationships within either the firm or the household to the 'market'. 
Government sets the rules of the game, through family law and through 
corporate governance. Corporate governance restricts the power of managers, 
even as managers try to do what they can to increase their discretionary power 
(see, for example, Edlin and Stiglitz, 1995). And, of course, corporate executives 
fight hard for legal frameworks that give them more discretion. For instance, 
they fought hard against initiatives of 'say in pay'. giving shareholders some 
say in the pay of the managers who are supposedly working for them (even 
when shareholder votes were non-binding). They suggested that the passage of 
say in pay would have a destructive effect on the functioning of the market 
economy: it would potentially curb their ability to extract rents from the 
corporation. 
1.2 Contract Enforcement 
Contract enforcement is of particular importance in the context of intertem-
poral contracts. 7 Again, the role of government is crucial: the government sets 
4 In this work, it is the rules governing IOdety as a whole that matter. 
s The conditions under which there is unanlmlty that it should max1m1z.e stock market value are 
everi more restrictive. 
6 See Grossman and St:JglJtz (1977, 1980). 
' The importance of contract enforcement is hJghllghted by sovereign wealth debts, where the 
ability to enforce contracts is partJcuiarJy llmlted, e.g. through reputation mechanisms (implicit 
contracts). See F.aton and Genovitz (1981); Eaton etal. (1986). 
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the rules determining how contracts will be enforced, and even. what kinds 
of contracts can be enforced. Individuals cannot sell themselves mto slavery, 
but student debt can essentially never be forgiven, with lenders being able to 
garnish 25 per cent of a worker's wages for his/her entire life. When the costs 
of contract enforcement are very high, de facto it is as if they are only enforced 
through reputation mechanisms. 
1 . 3 Competition and Power 
The strength of the underlying competitive paradigm in explaining resource 
allocation is so strong and pervasive that we forget that a country like the 
United States developed on the basis of slavery-the involuntary provision of 
labour. For long periods of time, various forms of feudalism, restricting con-
tracts that individuals or classes of individuals can undertake, persisted around 
large parts of the world. And even today, such restrictions effectively exist in 
some places. In many places, to increase the market power of one group, there 
were restrictions on what others could do (e.g. land ownership in apartheid 
South Africa). 
In some cases, the deviations from competition were enforced through what 
might be viewed as a market mechanism as part of a repeated game. It is easy 
to see how 'cooperative' behaviour among one group can be used to exclude 
others. Social capital may strengthen the functioning of society, but it can and 
has been used to enforce power relationships (see Dasgupta and Serageldin, 
2000; Dasgupta, 2005, 2012). In many cases, government actions were piv-
otal. In some cases, as in the case of racial discrimination in the United States, 
the two interacted. 
. This then~ the fundamental dilemma: the government is often complicitous 
: ~group. s expl
1
oitation of another. But the government is the only means 
e the Jungle -to prevent powerful groups from exploiting others. 
2 Public Governance 
The previous discussion should ha 
market economy without ve made it clear that the notion of a 
~ovemment-one way by !~~~:~:t intervention is a phantasm. Without 
Jungle. Power triumphs-until it is ty sets the rules of the game-there is a 
In recent decades eco i overcome by some stronger power. 
· ' nom sts have focu d 
action. Society is better off 1.f h se on the need for collective i or w en it act 11 . ~ ~n of public goods, proscrtbin activi . s co ectively-through the provi-
1ties, and encouraging those th gt . ~es that give rise to negative external-
be Paret · a give nse to positi 
o Improvements. But the most im ve externalities. There can 
portant arena for collective action is 
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the establishment of the rules of the game, enabling a market economy to 
function, enforcing contracts, and preventing the abuse of power, whether 
within an institution (e.g. through corporate governance rules) or within 
society (through antitrust laws). 
I need to emphasize: these rules relate to both equity and efficiency-an 
obvious observation in the context of competition policy. Without such pol-
icies, there is a tendency in market economies for the growth of market power; 
and that results both in Pareto-inefficient allocations and in distributions of 
income in which those with market power gain at the expense of the rest. 
In the standard economic model, the importance of these rules of the game 
was given short shrift. If the assumptions of the standard model were always 
satisfied, then these rules of the game might matter little. Unfortunately, as we 
have already noted, both for the economics profession and our society, those 
assumptions do not hold, and the formulation of economic policies on the 
belief that they do has had sometimes disastrous effects. 
To be fair, much of the policy advice (especially in the context of develop-
ment) over the past half century recognized that markets often didn't work 
well-though typically the onus was placed on government, blaming it for 
intervening in one way or another. The presumption was that if only govern-
ment got out of the way, we would wind up in a world well described by the 
competitive ideal. That idea was, of course, absurd: in the absence of govern-
ment intervention, markets do not gravitate towards the ideal, but rather in 
the opposite direction. The reason that countries have enacted competition 
laws is precisely that in the absence of government action, there is a tendency 
for excessive market concentration. Historically, many government interven-
tions have arisen out of public demands seeing massive market failures: inter-
ventionist (Keynesian) macro-policies from the excessive volatility of market 
economies, with persistent high unemployment; social security from the 
failure of the private sector to provide annuities at reasonable transaction 
costs; unemployment insurance and other social insurance from the failure 
of the market to provide adequate risk mitigation instruments, etc. Historic-
ally, many government interventions have arisen from public demands 
after massive market failures: interventionist (Keynesian) macro-policies in 
response to the excessive volatility of market economies, with persistent 
high unemployment; social security in response to the failure of the private 
sector to provide annuities at reasonable transaction costs; unemployment 
insurance and other social insurances in response to the failure of the market 
to provide adequate risk mitigation instruments, etc. 
But here, standard economics often makes two other mistakes: (a) assuming 
that so long as market imperfections are not too large, the economy can be 
well described by the competitive equilibrium model; and (b) ignoring the 
theory of the second-best. 
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d (1971) laid to rest the first idea: 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Diam: can have very large effects on 
even arbitrarily small information imperfe ons 
the nature of market equilibrium. i ssible to achieve anything like 
Policy analysts understood that it was mpti.oti e equilibrium model. There 
. . d in the compe v 
the ideal world envts1one . d . complete markets. These were 
would be information imperfections an ~nt d to government actions. But 
inherent market failures-not in any waydre la e uld lead to better outcomes-
. t wards that i ea wo 
they assumed that movtng 0 ld h·eve something like the ideal 
gh we wou ac i . and if we got close enou / . 1 was there no support for this 
. d by Adam Smith. Not on y . . .th 
results envtsage theoretical literature (begmmng WI 
conclusion, there was also a strong 1956) showing that these results 955 d L'psey and Lancaster, Meade, 1 an 1 hat free trade-in the absence of good 
were not true. Later work showed t b d Stiglitz 1984). 
k ne worse off (New ery an ' 
risk markets-could ma e everyo ic volatility (a theor-
Capital market liberalization could lead to more econ~m ealth of empirical 
etical proposition-see Stiglitz, 2008) supported now y a w 
evidence (Rodrik, 1998). ll d , 1 tin 
Before the 2008 financial crisis, there was an agenda ca e c~mpt~ ! 
markets'-creating new structured financial products, arguably trying g 
closer to the Arrow-Debreu complete set of risk markets: But more rece~t 
theoretical analyses have explained how this actually contributes to econoIIllc 
volatility (Guzman and Stiglitz, 2016a, 2016b), a~d ~e~e is ~ow a consen~~s 
that these products were an important factor in giving nse to the cns1s 
(FCIC, 2011). . 
Thus, the standard competitive equilibrium model is not the 'right' model 
for thinking about much of what goes on in the economy. Not surprisingly, it 
is particularly unsuited for reaching an understanding either of recent macro-
economic volatility or of the large increase in inequality. But it is not even the 
best model for thinking about the slowdown in economic growth, for explain-
ing the growth of short-termism in the economy and its increasing financia-
lization. These changes are not the result of enhanced understandings of 
economics, leading to improved strategies by firms or improved policies by 
government. 
An important development in economics in recent decades has been game 
theory-predicated on the belief that what matters is strategic interactions of a 
kind that simply don't exist in the standard competitive model. An important 
insight of game theory ls that the rules of the game matter. Market partici-
pants know this. 
There ls thus a metagame over the determination of the rules of the 
game. The rules of the game are set by the state, by government. Much of 
the fight today is over the determination of the rules governing labour-with 
corporations attempting to eviscerate the power of unions; competition 
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policy-with big behemoths arguing that their anti-competitive behaviour is 
really efficiency-enhancing and in the interests of ordinary consumers; and 
corporate governance-with those controlling large corporations trying to 
ensure that they have freer rein in doing what they want to do, including 
seizing for themselves a larger share of corporate revenues. 
In Rewriting the Rules (Stiglitz et al., 2015), we argued that beginning around 
a third of a century ago, the rules of American capitalism (and those of much 
of the rest of the advanced world) were rewritten, changed in ways that 
favoured the powerful at the expense of the rest. The liberalization agenda 
was actually a 'special interest' agenda, allowing, for instance, those in the 
financial sector to reap huge rewards from excessive risk taking, with the 
downside risks being borne by the public. 
The adverse effects of these rewritten rules were even greater because they 
led not only to more inequality, but also to lower growth, as they encouraged 
firms to focus on short-term financial returns, and to use their scarce capital 
for purposes other than investment in productivity enhancement. 
3 Reducing the Likelihood of State Capture 
The central issue, as we noted in the introduction, is that, while good govern-
ance is essential for a well-functioning society, ensuring the public good-
which a good set of rules does-is itself a public good, from which all benefit. 
There is always an undersupply of public goods (on their own), and this 
includes efforts at maintaining good public governance. By contrast, there 
are ample incentives to subvert good governance, resulting in efforts at rent 
seeking and state capture-using the power of the state, including its powers 
of compulsion, to advance particular interests. 
There is no easy or simple resolution to this problem. Some countries have 
done a reasonably good job of ensuring that the state advances the public 
interest; some have failed. Out of this wealth of experience-backed by a 
modicum of theoretical analyses-there are some precepts that may be useful. 
First, transparency is essential. Transparency in the public sphere is what 
good information is in the private sphere: without transparency, it is easy for 
special interests to divert state resources for their own purposes. Transparency 
includes the right to know (see e.g. Florini, 2007 and Stiglitz, 1999)-to know 
what the government is doing; and the right to disseminate (i.e. a free press)-
the right to tell (Islam 2002). But transparency also entails more: the provision 
of information is itself a public good, so that there will be an undersupply 
in the absence of government action to correct for this market failure (see 
Stiglitz 2002). 
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Transparency is often linked with accountability: there have to be 
consequences for one's actions. In the absence of transparency, there cannot 
be accountability. The problem though is that the relevant outcomes (Societal 
outcomes, or even more limited outcomes, say in the education sector) are the 
results of actions taken by multiple individuals, and it is typically impossible 
to parse out the (marginal) contribution of any single individual. And in many 
areas, the lags between the actions and the consequences may be large, With 
many intervening events. 
Among the most important aspects of the design of the public sector is a 
system of checks and balances, to reduce the risk of capture-with checks and 
balances, state capture requires a hold over multiple branches of government. 
But while a system of checks and balances makes capture more difficult, 
special interests have still managed to overcome the obstacle. 
Thus, the system of checks and balances has (so far) prevented one branch 
of the government dominating over another; but it has not prevented power-
ful groups from capturing the entire government, or to put it more mildly, 
from exercising disproportionate influence, of a kind inconsistent with demo-
cratic values. This failure can be traced to the failure of a broader set of checks 
and balances-within our society. As inequality grew in the United States 
during its gilded age, it became increasingly clear that excessive income and 
wealth inequality would lead to excessive political inequality. The reforms of 
the Progressive Era, including antitrust measures, were motivated by an under-
standing of the political process more than by insights from competitive 
market analyses. Their architects realized that ordinary sensibilities about 
w~at d~mocra~ a~d the principle of one-person-one vote mean were under-
mmed I~ s?cieties .m which there is excessive inequality. s It was apparent that 
economic. mequabty was being translated into political inequality. 
The Umted States shows the dangers of economic inequality . 
lated into political inequality, as the Republican Party (di ge~g tranels-
representing those t th t )9 sproportionat y 
disenfranchisement and ~!i :;::: many s~tes. engaged in a strategy of 
atthebottomtovoteandmoreJ.cel th e~t, making it more difficult for those 
They have openly engaged in y ai':tlf ~ey do vote, their vote won't matter. 
ices of the Supreme Court ing::: denng. ~e Republican-appointed just-
seemingly argued that mo~ey amous Citizens United decision in 2010, 
was not corrupting the litl al 
Elsewhere, I argued that these and oth po c process. . 
processes meant that it might better b . er ~hanges in America's political 
dollar, one vote' rather th ' e descnbed as a democracy with 'one 
an one person, one vote' (Stiglitz, 2012). 
: See Stiglltz (2015). 
Though as the 2016 el · 
of society. ectton showed so clearly, with signlfi cant support from other segments 
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Because the public good is a public good, society ought to do what it can to 
promote civic engagement in promotion of the public good. We now recognize 
the central role of civil society-groups within society getting together, volun-
tarily, to advance their conception of the public interest. 10 That is, collective 
action occurs not just through national governments, but through a host of 
institutional arrangements, some government Oocal governments) and some 
non-governmental. The government can (and should) subsidize and encourage, 
in a variety of ways, these organizations, because they are the means by which the 
voice of various groups within society can get injected into the political process. 
This is one of the ways in which thinking about development (markets, states, 
and institutions) has changed: as we noted in the introduction, we used to view 
society in dichotomous terms-states or markets (sometimes emphasizing their 
complementarity). But there are a host of other institutional arrangements and 
players-the most successful institutions in the United States are arguably not-for-
profit educational institutions. In fact, for-profit universities are among the least 
successful institutions. Even in the United States, in many areas, cooperatives play 
an important role (credit unions and agriculture cooperatives are two examples). 
4 Concluding Remarks 
This essay is about both economic policy and economic methodology. I have 
argued that the standard workhorse model of economics, the competitive 
equilibrium model, provides a poor description either of advanced or devel-
oping economies, and policy frameworks based on that model have proved 
less effective than hoped. 
In one of his last acts as chief economist of the World Bank, Kaushik 
brought together past chief economists as well as other development experts 
to see whether there was a post-Washington Consensus consensus. There 
Was-articulated in the Stockholm Consensus. The theoretical models under-
lying that new consensus go well beyond the standard competitive equilib-
rium model. So too, the policy advice goes beyond 'improve markets' and 
'increase resources'. 
I have argued that the pervasive imperfections of competition imply the 
relevance of game theory. And the constant changing in the economy-both 
in response to new ideas and new technologies-suggests the relevance of 
ideas borrowed from evolutionary theory. But it is evolution without tele-
ology, without any notion that we are necessarily moving in directions that 
make everyone in society better off. Indeed, in some cases, societies can get 
10 Of course, special interests often try to cloak themselves in the gul5e of civil society, and it is 
not always easy to distinguish between the two. 
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caught in low-level equilibrium traps; in others, some gain, but at the ~ 
of others. 11 
This chapter argues that economists should strive to base their policy ~ 
on a broader set of models--Of understandings that go beyond economtcs 
narrowly defined. But it also argues that much of the standard policy advice is 
not based on a deep grasp of economics. Standard policy has failed to W1deJ:stand 
the implications of the theory of the second-best, the lack of robustness of the 
standard model-where small deviations from idealized assumptions have great 
effects-and has not really acknowledged that markets need to be structured. 
The standard model portrays the market economy as a tine-tuned machine. 
Economists' job is only to keep it well oiled, and more importantly, to stay 
out of the way-to make sure that government intervention didn't muck up 
the works. But upon closer examination, it is dear that market economies, 
unless tempered, create a dynamic that may not be consistent with their own 
(successful) survival: a selfishness, which breeds inequities and injustices; a 
lack of trust and dishonesty, which undermines the functioning of markets 
themselves; and a weakening of the state, which makes it unable to govern the 
market and to make investments that can sustain learning. Can we have cheap 
labour and well-heeled consumers? For a time, perhaps, but recent history 
suggests there will eventually be an unravelling. 
The rewriti~g of the rules of the market economy a third of a century ago, to 
advanc~ the mterests of the wealthiest, impaired the functioning of the mar-
ket. This led to slower growth and more instability-includin th I est 
.... thr g earg 
economic cnsis m ee quarters of a century. Markets can be self-destructive. 
The market needs to be saved from itself. 
But the political process that might do this has increasing! be tured 
by the wealthy in society. The United States prided itself in C:ea: cap t 
of c~ecks and balances between branches of government Whil g a sys em 
of gndlock may not have been full anti . . e the dangers 
the dysfunction to their liki y crpated, many in the elites may find 
exploitation of others too weankgt: a poli~cal system too weak to stop their 
1 o even unpose at . . 
of progressivity. (In the United Stat ax system with a modicum 
country, the very rich actual! ~s, unlike almost any other advanced 
y pay qmte a low effective tax rate.)12 
n F 
or a brief discussion of th 
Hoff and Stiglitz (2001) ese traps, especially viewed With! . 
12 Thi 1 · n an evolutionary context see s ow effective tax t , Republican . ra e was underlined b th 
income in tixr:1~~tial candidate at the time had ~:e~atlo~ in 2012 that Mitt Romney, the 
that 'I pay all the. tax~yt practically boasted about the lo:~~t : 14 per cent of his ~ 
political discourse that b:a;e leg~ reqUlred and not a dollar m~re ~ ~r:!oyed, saying ln a debate 
quarters, the mark of a , ng a ut &aming the system fo · a pathology of American 
responsibility. This athof ood businessman' and not a s r personal gain has become, in some 
President, Donald rl:nnp. ogy was of course on display d1!!:"~at someon~ is deftdent in dvic -~~thecampatgnofthe currentUS 
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But in a deeper sense, in terms of the functioning of society and the political 
system as a whole, there is an absence of checks and balances-no way, short 
of a wholesale recommitment to an agenda of greater equality, of preventing 
those at the top from continuing their aggrandizement of power; no way to 
prevent the concentration of economic and political power; no way to ensure 
a true democracy even in the market place of ideas. 
In the introduction, we noted that markets do not exist in a vacuum. They 
have to be structured, and they have to be seen in the context of the richer 
ecology of institutions within our society; so too for non-market institutions, 
most importantly the state. 
Kaushik is one of the few economists who has seen markets, the state, and 
institutions within this holistic framework, and who has demonstrated the 
ability to use models in the way they should be. Simple models can provide 
important insights, such as his path-breaking work on child labour. One needs 
precisely the right degree of complexity-to capture that which is relevant, 
excluding the extraneous; and the right degree of simplicity-so that one can 
thoroughly understand what is going on. But too often, economists who have 
proven their mettle in model formulation and analytics lose the ability to 
exercise judgement when it comes to policy. They do not understand the 
limitations of each model and how to blend the insights of various models 
together coherently, with the whole being greater than the sum of the parts. It 
is because Kaushik was able to combine these deep analytic skills with this 
superb judgement that he has been such an outstanding public servant. 
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